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Most  standard  solution  concepts  of  extensive  games  are  history-insensitive  in  the  sense  that  no 
matter  at  which  information  set  one  is,  it  is assumed  that  each  player  believes  that  everybody  else 
is  rational.  In  reality,  each  history  of  moves  reveals  certain  traits  of  the  players  to  one  another. 
It  is  argued  in  this  paper  that  solution  concepts  ought  to  make  use  of  this  fact.  An  example  of 
such  a concept  is developed  and  called  a  ‘reasonable  solution’  set.  It  is shown  that  this  can  explain 
cooperation  in  certain  finitely-repeated  games  like  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma. 
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1.  Introduction 
Most  solution  concepts  of  extensive  games,  e.g.,  perfection  (Selten,  1975)  or 
rationalizability  (Pearce,  1984) are  ‘history-insensitive’,  in the  sense that  no  matter 
at which  information  set one  is in the  game,  in what  remains  it is implicitly  assumed 
that  each  player  believes  that  everybody  else is rational.  That  is, even if a player  has 
revealed  himself  irrational,  others  continue  to believe  he is rational.  In reality,  a par- 
ticular  history  of moves  may  reveal  to a player  traits  of the other  players  and thereby 
influence  his play  in the  remainder  of  the  game.  The  present  paper  is an attempt  to 
introduce  this  idea  formally. 
Another  motivation  for  this  paper  is the  inability  of  existing  solution  concepts  to 
explain  cooperation  among  players  in  some  repeated  games.  The  most  prominent 
example  is the  finitely-repeated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  where  common  sense  suggests 
that  there  may  be cooperation  in the  early  games  but  standard  solutions,  including 
rationalizability,  predict  noncooperation  throughout.  In an important  contribution, 
Kreps  et al.  (1982) have  explained  cooperation  in early  games  by assuming  that  one 
player  believes  that  the  other  person  may  be a tit-for-tat  player.  This  is however  not 
enough  because  in  reality  even  when  two  experts  in  game  theory,  who  have  no  a 
priori  doubts  about  each  other’s  expertise,  play  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  we expect 
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to  see some  cooperation.  How  does  one  explain  this?  While  no  firm  answer  is given 
here,  I will argue  that  an  important  step  to  explaining  this  is to  look  for  a suitable 
history-sensitive  solution  concept.  The  specific  one  suggested  in this paper  is intend- 
ed  to  motivate  such  a  search. 
Attention  is confined  here  to  games  of  perfect  information.  This  has  the  virtue 
of  simplicity;  but,  more  importantly,  in  games  of  perfect  information  the  set  of 
possible  outcomes  according  to  different  solution  criteria  tend  to  coincide.  Thus 
though  the  formal  model  here  is developed  along  the  lines  of  Pearce,  my  critique 
is applicable  to  the  perfect  equilibrium  concept  as  well. 
I  motivate  the  reader  by  presenting  a  game  which  shares  the  basic  problem  of 
repeated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  but  has  the  advantage  of  even  greater  simplicity.  The 
game  may  be  called  passing-the-parcel:  There  are  two  players,  One  and  Two,  and 
One  has  a parcel  with  him.  The  first  move  is One’s.  He  can  keep  the  parcel  (fink) 
or  pass  it on  to  Two  (coop).  If  he finks  he gets three  units  of  money  and  Two  gets 
nothing  and  the  game  ends  there.  If  he coops,  each  player  gets  two  units  of  money 
and  it  is now  player  Two’s  move.  Player  Two  may  keep  it,  in  which  case  he  gets 
three  units  and  the  other  player  nothing  and  the  game  ends  there,  or  he  may  pass 
it  on  which  gives  each  player  two  units.  And  so on.  The  hundreth  move  is the  last 
one:  suppose  starting  from  the  first  one,  coop  has  been  played  99 times.  Now  the 
parcel  is with  player  Two.  If  he  plays  fink,  he  gets  three  units  and  One  gets  zero 
and  the  game  ends.  If  he  plays  coop,  they  both  get  two  units  and  the  game  ends. 
The  total  amount  that  a player  earns  is the  sum  of  his earnings  after  each  move  as 
specified  above. 
What  is the  expected  outcome  of  this  game?  Note  first  that  if both  players  coop 
throughout,  each  player  gets a total  of 200.  However,  all standard  solution  concepts 
predict  a  unique  outcome:  Player  One  will  fink  in the  first  move  and  that  will be 
the  end  with  player  One  having  earned  three  and  player  Two,  zero!  The  argument 
is the  familiar  backward  induction  one  (see,  e.g.,  Kreps  et  al.,  1982).  The  trouble 
with  this  solution  is that  it is experimentally  invalidated  and  seems  flawed  on  intro- 
spection. 
To  explain  the  essential  shortcoming  of  rationalizability  or  perfection  in explain- 
ing the  outcome  of  passing-the-parcel,  it is enough  to  consider  a 3-move  variant  of 
the  lOO-move  version  just  described.  The  game  is illustrated  on  the  next  page. K.  Basu  /  Extensive  games  249 
Since this is a game  of perfect  information  we need  not  distinguish  between  a node 
and  an information  set.  The  backward  induction  argument  goes as follows:  At node 
y,  One  will fink  and  get  7 instead  of  cooping  and  getting  6.  Since  Two  knows  that 
One  is rational,  he  knows  this.  So at node  x,  Two  will fink  rather  than  coop.  Since 
finking  gives  him  5 and  cooping  4.  Since  One  knows  that  Two  is rational  and  that 
Two  knows  that  One  is rational,  at  node  W, One  will  fink! 
Let us examine  this last step carefully.  If One  finks,  het gets 3. If instead  he coops, 
the  game  moves  on  to  node  x.  Now  consider  Two  pondering  his  decision  at  node 
x.  If  he  believes  that  One  is rational,  he  should  fink.  But,  at  x,  should  he  believe 
One  is rational?  It  is not  clear  that  he should.  The  fact  that  the  game  has  reached 
x means  One  is not  rational  in a conventional  sense.  Two  will be quite  baffled  and 
it will not  be unreasonable  if he supposes  that  One  is an  ‘unpredictable’  player  and 
may  play  coop  at y.  So  he,  in  turn,  may  move  coop  at x.  And  realizing  this,  One 
may  find  it worthwhile  to  move  coop  at  the  initial  node  W. The  argument  is much 
stronger  in  the  early  play  of  longer  games. 
Playing  coop  at  w would  be  irrational  by  the  conventional  standards  of  game 
theory.  But  it is an  ‘irrational’  move  made  for  strategic  reasons.  Also  interesting  to 
note  is that  Two’s  move  coop  at node  x is not  irrational.  Because  in the light  of  One 250  K.  Basu  /  Extensive  game5 
having  revealed  his irrationality,  playing  coop  at x can  no  longer  be  ruled  out.  Of 
course,  at y,  One  will  always  play  fink,  since  One’s  earlier  ‘irrational’  move  was 
merely  meant  to  confuse  Two,  and  did  not  reflect  actual  irrationality. 
The  direction  we will explore  has the shortcoming  that  generally  no unique  predic- 
tion  is possible.  But the  response  to this is similar  to the  one  given  by Pearce  (1984): 
That  in many  extensive  game  situations  a  wide  variety  of  outcomes  are  plausible. 
To  rule  these  out  by  some  rule  of  thumb  does  not  enhance  our  predictive  ability. 
Also,  the  spirit  of  the  argument  that  I will use  is very  similar  to  that  of  Bernheim 
and  Pearce.  It  gives  us a  broadened  solution  concept  which  is really  the  outcome 
of  pursuing  their  own  argument  further. 
Having  done  this,  we may  once  again  undertake  research  to  refine  our  solution. 
One  may  think  of  some  routes  of  solution-refinement  undertaken  in the  literature; 
e.g.,  Myerson  (1978)  or  Pearce  (1984)  in  his  Section  5.  This  has  not  been  done  in 
this paper  which  merely  suggests  a way of  building  in history-sensitivity  and  thereby 
of  understanding  why  cooperation  may  occur  in the  early  games  in repeated  game 
theory  or  why  individuals  may  make  moves  which  appear  irrational. 
2.  Basic  concepts 
An  extensive  game  of  perfect  information  is described  briefly,  following  mainly 
the  notation  of  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982)  and  Mclennan  (1985). 
An extensive  game,  I-, consists  of a finite  set,  T, of nodes,  which  is strictly  partial- 
ly ordered  by  <.  For  all x, ye  T,  ‘x<y’  represents  ‘x precedes  y’  or  ‘y succeeds  x’. 
The  pair  (T, <)  forms  an arborescence.’  An  initial  node  is one  with  no  predecessor. 
r  has  a unique  initial  node  and  the  symbol  w is reserved  for  it.  For  any  node  x E T, 
its immediate  predecessor  (if  it exists)  is denoted  by p1 (x).  The  n th predecessor  of 
x  is  defined  inductively  as  follows:  p,,(x)  =p,(pn_  , (x)).  For  all  XE T,  we  define 
pO(x) =x.  An  immediate  successor  of  x  is  defined  analogously.  For  any  XE T,  I 
shall  use  S(x)  to  denote  the  set  of  immediate  successors  of  x.  The  set  of  terminal 
nodes  is denoted  by  Z=  {t E T (  S(t)  = @} and  the  set  of  nonterminal  nodes,  also 
known  as decision  nodes,  is denoted  by  H=  T \Z. 
Also  specified  in  the  game,  r,  is a  finite  set,  A,  of  actions,  and  a  mapping  a, 
a:  T\{w}-+A, 
where  (T(X)  is the  fast  action  taken  to  reach  x.  For  all XE H,  cr(S(x))  is the  set  of 
actions  available  at x.  This  is denoted,  in brief,  as A(x).  That  is, A(x) = c@(x)).  I 
assume  {A(x) IXE H}  is a  partition  of  A. 
Next  we have  a  set I=  { 1, . . . . N}  of  pIayers,  and  {Hi}i,l  is a  partition  of  H.  If 
x E Hi,  then  player  i has  to  choose  an  action  at x.  Since  r  is a game  of  perfect  in- 
formation  there  is no  need  to  distinguish  between  nodes  and  information  sets. 
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Finally,  specified  in r  is a  utility  function  for  each  player  i: 
ui:Z+R,  ViEI, 
where  R  is the  set  of  real  numbers. 
For  all x E H,  if we consider  x and  all the  successors  of x in  T and  take  the  restric- 
tion  of all the above  definitions  to this subset  of  T, then  this comprises  a game which 
has  x  as its  initial  node.  Such  a  game  is called  a subgame  of  r  and  is denoted  by 
f,.  For  a  more  precise  definition  of  subgames,  see Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982). 
A pure  strategy  of  player  i is a  mapping 
si:Hi-+A 
such  that  for  all  XE Hi,  si(x) E A(x).  We  denote  the  set  of  all  pure  strategies  of 
player  i by  S’.  For  any  finite  set F,  let  A(F)  be  the  set  of  all  probability  distribu- 
tions  over  F: 
A(F)=  meRF  c  m(t)=l,  m(t)rO,  VtcF  . 
I  I  teF  1 
The  set  of  all  mixed  strategies  of  player  i  is  given  by  d(S’).  A  mixed  strategy 
M Ed  which  gives a probability  of  one  to s E S’ is not  distinguished  here  from  s. 
For  any  subgame  r,,  I use  SL to  denote  the  set  of  all  pure  strategies  of  player  i 
in  I-,. 
Given  sets  T’ , . . . , TV,  I shall  denote  its Cartesian  product,  T’  x  a-- x  T.‘,  by 171’ 
or  IIT’.  Let  s = (s ’ , . . . , s.‘)  E 17s’  and  XE T.  We  say  that  x  is reached  by  s  if  the 
following  is true:  Either  x=  w or  w is the n th predecessor  of x and  with  i(t)  denoting 
the  player  whose  move  it  is  at  p,(x),  we  have  s”“(p,(x))=cr(p,_,(x)),  for  all 
1E{l,...,  n}.  If  sieSi  and  XE T,  we  say  that  si  reaches  x  if  there  exist  sj,Sj,  for 
all j#i  such  that  (st, . . . ,sN)  reaches  x. 
Let  m=(mi,...,  mN)E17A(Si)  and  XE T.  We  say  that  x  is reached  by  m  if  there 
exists  (s’ , . . . ,sN)  such  that  m’(s’)>O,  for  all  i El  and  (s’, . . . ,sN)  reaches  x.  The 
probability  of  reaching  x,  given  that  m  is being  played,  is denoted  by p(x,m): 
c  m ‘(s’)m’(s*)  .e+  m”(sV)  =p(x,  m). 
s reaches  x 
The  expected  utility  function  of  i,  CJ’  : liU(S’)  -+ R,  is derived  in a usual  manner 
from  i’s  utility  function.  That  is,  for  all  m E I7d  (si), 
U’(m)  =  C  u”(z)p(z, m). 
ZEZ 
Given  a strategy  N-tuple  m E I7A(.S’)  and a strategy  ,8’ E d(S’),  m/b’  is the strategy 
N-tuple  derived  by  replacing  the  ith-element  of  m  with /3’. Let  s’EB’CS’.  Then  si 
is a  best  response  to  mEIIA(S’)  among  all elements  of  B’  (or,  simply,  in B’)  if 
U’(m/s’)z  U’(m/t’),  Vtic  B’. 
Given  s E S’ and  x E H,  an x-replacement  of  s is any  strategy  t E S’ such  that  for 252  K.  Basu  /  Extensive  games 
all yeH  such  that  yfx  and  y  is not  a  successor  of  x,  s(y)=@). 
For  a  player  i playing  YES’  a  conjecture  is a  mapping, 
c; : H’+Ll(S’)  x  ~~~xd(s’-‘)x{s)xd(s’+‘)x~~~xd(s~~), 
such  that  for  all xeH’  that  can  be  reached  by  s,  c$>  reaches  x,  and  if xcy  and 
c!(x)  reaches  y  then  c:(x)  = cf;cV). 
By saying  that  i playing  s has  a conjecture,  we mean  that  at each  node  which  can 
be  reached  by s and  where  i has  to  choose  an  action,  i has  a belief  about  each j#  i 
as  to  which  pure  strategy  he  may  be  playing  with  some  probability.  This  is equi- 
valent  to conjecturing  thatj  is playing  a particular  mixed  strategy  (Pearce,  1984, Ap- 
pendix  A).  It will be foolish  of  him if he believes  people  are  playing  strategies  which 
cannot  reach  the  node  that  has been  reached.  So we rule this out.  Also,  till a player’s 
belief  about  what  the  others  are  playing  is actually  revealed  to  be false,  he does  not 
change  his  belief. 
Now we define  for each player  his set of  ‘rationalizable  strategies’.  Informally  speak- 
ing,  a  player  is rational  if  his chosen  strategy  can  be  thought  of  as a  best  response 
to  some  conjecture  at  each  decision  node  of  this  player.  It  is assumed  that  players 
are rational,  they  know  that  they  are rational,  etc.  In short,  the rationality  of  players 
is ‘common  knowledge’.  Hence,  each  player  will first  delete  his strategies  which  are 
not  best  responses  to  some  strategy  vector  which  the  others  might  adopt.  Having 
done  this,  and  knowing  that  others  have  also  done  the  same,  each  player  will once 
again  check  whether  further  strategies  can  be  deleted.  Such  iterative  deletion  con- 
tinues  and  what  remains  in  the  end  comprises  the  set  of  rationalizable  strategies. 
Now  for  the  formal  definition. 
Given  X’cd(S’),  for  all ~EI,  and  SES’,  define  J’(s, {X’})  = {xEH’  I3m  ELF, 
such  that  m/s  reaches  x}.  Thus  J’(s, {X’})  is the  set  of  nodes  in H’  which  can  be 
reached  if i plays  s and  for  all TE I\  (i},  he expects  f to  choose  a strategy  from  Xr. 
Definition  1. For  all non-negative  integer  t,  and  for  all ie  I,  the  set S’(t)  is defined 
iteratively  as  follows: 
For  all  iE1,  S’(0) =S’. 
SE S’(t)  iff  s E S’(t -  1) and  3  a  conjecture  ci  such  that  for  all 
XEJ$s,{S’(f-l)}),  C;(X)ELl(S*(r-l))X  -**  x A(SN(t  -  1));  and  s  is  a  best  re- 
sponse  to  c:(x)  among  all x-replacements  for  s in  S’(t-  1). 
The  set  of  rationalizable  strategies  of  player  i in r  is denoted  by  R’(r),  and  is 
defined  as  follows. 
R’(r)=  t  S’(t),  icl. 
I=0 
The  collection  of  all rationalizable  strategy  N-tuples  l7R’(r)  is labelled  the  rationa- 
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3.  Strategic  irrationality 
A  shortcoming  of  this  solution  concept  is its  history-insensitivity.  Let  r’  be  a 
subgame  of  r.  The  rationalizable  solution  set of  r,  in no  way depends  on  the infor- 
mation  revealed  in  the  fact  of  node  x  having  been  reached.  That  is,  if  there  is 
another  subgame  r,,  identical  to  r,,  then  its solution  set  must  be identical  to  that 
of  r,.  Players  learn  nothing  by  observing  how  others  have  played  thus  far,  while 
contemplating  moves!  But  surely  an  essential  feature  of  an  extensive  game  is that 
players  have  the  scope  for  learning  about  others  during  the  course  of  the  game. 
What  I proceed  to  do  is to  introduce  such  learning  in  a  small  way. 
First  note  that  in the  model  of  Section  2,  it is implicitly  built  in that  each  player 
believes  everybody  is rational  and  he maintains  this  belief  no  matter  where  he is in 
the  game  tree. 
Let  us see what  the  solution  set of rwould  look  like if a subset,  Q,  of  the  players 
is believed  to be irrational.  It is not  being  assumed  that  members  of Q are irrational, 
but  simply  that  for  each  i E a,  all Jo  1\  {i}  believe  that  i  is  irrational  and  it  is 
common  knowledge  that  all i~1\  {i]  believe  that  i is irrational.  If  a player  is irra- 
tional  -  we shall  often  refer  to  him  as unpredictable  -  it means  that  he may  choose 
any  available  strategy.  A game  Tin  which  Q is the  set of  players  believed  to  be un- 
predictable  will be denoted  by  (CQ).  The  rationalisable  strategies  of  players  for  a 
game  (KQ)  may  now  be  formally  defined. 
Definition  2.  For  all  non-negative  integer,  t,  and  for  all  ~EI,  we  define  g  se; 
S’(t) C S’ as follows:  V’i  E R and  Vt,  and  S’(t)  = S’.  And  Vie  Q,  s’(O) = S’ and  S’(t) 
is defined  recursively  as follows:  s E S’(t)  iff  s E S’(t  -  1) and  3  a conjecture  ci such 
that  VXE J’(s, (S’(t  -  l))), 
cf(x)ELl(S1(t-  1))x  ..- x A(SN(t  -  1)); and  s is a best  response  to  c:(x)  among  all 
x-replacements  for  s in  S’(t  -  1). 
For  all  icl,  define  R’(C  Q) = n,“,,  S’(t). 
The  set  of  rationalizable  strategies  of  player  i in  (f,  Q)  is denoted  by  R ‘(K 12) and 
is defined  as  follows: 
ViEI\Q,  R’(I-,S2)=l?i(KQ),  and 
VEER,  scRi(T,Q)  iff  seS’and 
3  a  conjecture  c:’  such  that  Vx~f(s,  {R’(T,Q))),  c~(x)Ed(R’(r,R)x  .-a x 
d(RN(T,SZ));  and  s  is a  best  response  to  c:(x)  among  all x-replacements  of  s. 
The  rationalizable  solution  set  for  (C Q)  is ffR  ‘(r, Q). 
It  is important  to  understand  why  for  i E 52, R’(r,  Sz) f  I? ‘(r, ~2). Since  such  an  i 
is believed  to  be irrational,  others  believe  he  may  play  anything  in R’(r,  Q)  which 25-I  K.  Bum  i  Extensive  gamer 
is equal  to  S’.  But  since  i is actual/y  rational,  he  would  not  consider  playing  any 
strategy  in  S’ but  only  those  which  are  best  responses  to  what  he  believes  others 
may  play.  R’(KQ)  is the  set  of  such  moves. 
Note  that  once  we have  Definition  2,  Definition  1 becomes  a  special  case  where 
for  all  i E I,  R’(r)  = R’(f,  $I). 
The  next  step  involves  identifying  unpredictable  players.  Since  each  node  XE T, 
has  a  history  of  moves,  at  each  such  node  we could  think  of  a  set  of  players  who 
appear  as unpredictable  to  others.  We begin  by  formalizing  this  idea  in an  abstract 
form.  Let  2’ be  the  power  set  of  I.  The  function,  Q,  defined  as 
will be called  a predictability  map.  A predictability  map  identifies  at each  node  the 
set  of  players  who  appear  unpredictable  or  irrational  to  others. 
In this paper  I shall be concerned  with a specific  predictability  map,  one  suggested 
naturally  by  the  works  of  Bernheim  and  Pearce.  I  shall  assume  that  a  player  is 
believed  to  be rational  till he is revealed  to  be not  so,  in the  sense  of  Pearce  (1984), 
that  is, till  he makes  a move  that  is not  rationalizable.  Hence  0(w)  = @. Now  con- 
sider  a  node  y,  where  Q(y)  = @J,  and  i has  to  move.  Suppose  he  chooses  an  action 
which  is incompatible  with  any  rationalizable  strategy  of  his  and  which  takes  the 
game  to node  x.  Then  it is reasonable  to  suppose  that,  Q(x) = {i}.  Hence  in the sub- 
game  r’,  we would  expect  each  playerj  to adopt  a strategy  belonging  to Ri(rx,  {i)). 
Similarly  if Q(x)  is the  set of  players  believed  to  be unpredictable  at node  x,  then 
x onwards  we expect  a playerj  to play  from  Ri(rx,  Q(x)).  Ifj  makes  a move  incom- 
patible  with any  strategy  in this set his name  gets added  to the set of  players  believed 
to  be  unpredictable.  This  informal  idea  is now  made  rigorous. 
Definition  3.  A specific  predictability  map,  0,  is defined  as  follows.  Let  XE T and 
p,,(x)=w.  Let  ~:{l,...,n}  *I  be  such  that  Vj,  7(j)  satisfies  Pi(X) E H’(j).  If x can 
be  reached  by  some  s~J7R’(r,@),  then  o(x)  =@.  If  not,  then  let  p,,(x)  be  the 
closest  predecessor  of  x  reached  by  some  s~l7R’(T,  4).  If  x  can  be  reached  by 
some  s~17R~(r~,,(,),{~(t,)}),  then  h(x)=  {r(t,)}.  If  not,  then  let  P,~(x)  be  the 
closest  predecessor  of  x  that  can  be  reached  by  some  SEI~R~(~~,,(.,), {  r(f,)}).  If  x 
can  be  reached  by  some  s~l7R~(l-“,,(.~,, {7(t,),  7(b)}),  then  Q(X)  =  {7(tl),  7(h)}.  If 
not,  we continue  in the  same  way.  Since  rhis is a finite  game,  we must  reach  tk such 
that  {  r(t,),  . . . , 7(tk)}  =  l?(x). 
In  Pearce’s  work,  the  predictability  map  used  implicitly  is one  where  C?(x)=@, 
for  all x.  Once  this  is amended,  as  per  Definition  3,  it  becomes  necessary  to  re- 
define  rationalizable  strategies.  We do  this  by  defining  sophisticated  rationalizable 
strategies  of  each  player. 
Definition  4.  For  all  JE  2’,  define  K(J)  = {xEHI  f&x) = J}.  Let  n(J)  be  the 
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XI (J), *  *  *  9 --G?(J)  (J).  If  K,(J)  is a  set  containing  Xj(J)  and  all  its  successors  in K(J), 
then  {Ki (J),  . . . , &(J)(J))  is a  partition  of  K(J).  The  set  of  sophisticated  rationa- 
lizable  strategies  of  player  i in f  is denoted  by  E’(T)  and  defined  as  follows: 
E’(T)=  {sES~I  VJ, Vj,  if  Kj(J)fIH’#@,  then 
3t E R ‘(J-&,(J),  J)  such  that  VXEKj(J)fIH’,  S(X)=t(X)). 
A  person  playing  a  strategy  in  E’(T)  is just  a  more  sophisticated  version  of 
Pearce’s  player.  What  he does  is this.  He  begins  by  assuming  that  everybody  is ra- 
tional,  chooses  a rationalizable  strategy  and continues  to play  it, as long  as his initial 
assumption  of  everybody  being  rational  is not  contradicted.  As soon  as he reaches 
a  node  where  somebody  has  been  revealed  irrational,  he  revises  his initial  opinion 
and  computes  the  set  of  his  rationalizable  strategies  taking  into  account  that  R  is 
no  longer  empty.  He continues  with  a rationalizable  strategy  in this  subgame  till he 
once  again  reaches  a node  where  some  other  player  is revealed  irrational.  And  so 
on.* 
This  approach  has the  weakness  that  unless someone  is revealed  irrational,  others 
believe  he  will  continue  to  make  rationalizable  moves  only.  Irrationality  is never 
anticipated.  Nevertheless,  this  is an  improvement  over  standard  approaches  where 
even  after  a  player  is revealed  to  be  irrational,  others  believe  he  is rational.  It  is 
therefore  claimed  that  for  purposes  of prediction  we ought  to,  as a first  step,  eschew 
rationalizability  in  favor  of  sophisticated  rationalizability.  However,  as  the  next 
theorem  suggests,  this  will  not  make  any  difference  in  terms  of  outcomes. 
For  any  set GCKS’,  define  B(G) = {ZE Z 1  z can  be reached  by some  SE G).  B(G) 
consists  of  terminal  nodes  which  can  be reached  by  some  strategy  N-tuple  in G.  If 
G and  G’are  such that  B(G) = B(G’),  we say that  G and  G’are  realization  equivalent. 
Theorem  1.  Given  any  game  I-,  (i) the  rationalizable  solution  set  of  r  and  I7E’(f) 
are realization  equivalent,  and  (ii) E’(f)  is non-empty,  Vie  I. 
Proof.  (i) Let  z E O(LTR’(r))  and  s = (s’ , . . . ,sN)  E ffR’(Q  be  such  that  s reaches  z. 
Hence  O(z)=@  and  Vx<z,  O(x)=@. 
VieI,  construct  tieSi  as  follows:  VJe2’  and  VjE{l,...,n(J)}  such  that 
Kj,(J)nH’=@,  choose  any  strategy  from  R’(r,(,,,J)  and  call  it  ruJ.  Note  that 
R’(Tx,CJ,,  J)  must  be  non-empty  since  R’(r x,(J),  @)  = R’(T&,)  is a  subset  of  it  and 
the  non-emptiness  of  Ri(Ix&  is assured  by  proposition  4 in Pearce  (1984).  Now, 
’ When  it is said  that  playerj  has  been  revealed  irrational,  it means  that  he has been  observed  making 
a move  which  is not  rationalizable.  it  is not  necessary  that  others  actually  think  that j  is irrational.  They 
may well be aware  that j  is up to some  tricks.  But if others  reason  as players  do in the papers  of Bernheim 
and  Pearce,  they will be puzzled  by j’s  behavior.  And  even if they realize that  clever j  is up to some  tricks, 
they  will not  be able  to figure  out  what  the tricks  are.  It is simply  being  assumed  that  under  such circum- 
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VxEKj(J)nH’,  define  r’(x) = r”](x).  Since  {Kj(J)nH’},,  is a partition  of  H’,  this 
completely  defines  t’(x),  and  by  the  mode  of  construction  it  follows  that  t’~E’(r). 
Since  x<z  implies  XEK(@),  if x<z  and  it is player  r(x)‘s  move  at x,  then  t r(x)(~)  = 
srCX)(x).  Hence,  (t ‘, . . . , r.‘)  reaches  z.  Thus  z E 8(&(T)). 
To  prove  the  converse  suppose  L E B(AC!?(T))  and  s = (s ‘, . . . ,s.‘)  E Z’&(T) 
reaches  z.  We shall  prove  by  induction  that  Vx<  z,  Q(x) = @. By definition  d(w)  = 
0.  Suppose  x is such  that  w <XC  z and  a(~,  (x)) = @. Let pl (x) be i’s decision  node. 
Then  3ti~Ri(T,,.,Q(w))=Ri(f)  such  that  s’(p,(x))=t’(p,(x)).  Hence  o(x)=@. 
Let  M’={xEH~Ix<:).  If  #E,!?(T),  then  3ti~Ri(T,,~(w))=Ri(T)  such  that 
VXEM’,  s’(x)=t’(x).  For  each  icf,  choose  such  a l’.  Hence  t=(t’,  . . ..~“)EI~R~(T) 
and  t  reaches  z.  This  completes  the  proof  of  (0. 
(ii) Proposition  4 of  Pearce  (1984) ensures  the  non-emptiness  of  the  rationalizable 
solution  set.  Hence  (i) implies  (ii).  0 
In  playing  a  sophisticated  rationalizable  strategy,  a  player  takes  into  account 
whether  someone  has revealed  himself  as irrational.  But since no one  makes  an ‘irra- 
tional’  move,  nodes  where  Q+@  are  never  reached.  This  is the  idea  behind  part  (i) 
of  Theorem  1. 
However,  once  we realize  that  players  will play  sophisticated  rationalizable  stra- 
tegies,  we cannot  really  rule  out  strategic  irrational  moves.  Players  may  have  an ad- 
vantage  in appearing  irrational.  The  main  solution  concept  suggested  in this  paper, 
allows  for  such  strategic  irrationality.  We  define  this  next. 
Definition  5.  The  set of  reasonable  strategies  of  player  i in r,  denoted  by D’(T)  is 
defined  as  follows:  SED’(T)  iff  3  a  conjecture  ci  such  that  VXE J’(s, {E’(T)}), 
c:EilEi(T)x  a**  x dE’_‘(T)x{s}xdE’+‘(T)x...  xdEN(r)  and  s  is  a  best  re- 
sponse  to  c:(x)  among  all x-replacements  for  s in S’. The  reasonable  solution  set of 
f  is n@(r). 
Theorem  2.  The  reasonable  solution  set  of  a game,  I-,  is non-empty. 
Proof.  By Theorem  1, E’(T)  # @, Vr E I.  Let  m ‘, . . . , mN  be  such  that  Vj#  i,  mj  is 
a mixed  strategy  giving  positive  weights  to  all strategies  in Ej(T).  Since  S’ is finite, 
3s E S’ such  that  s  is a best  response  to  m ‘, . . . , m N in  S’. 
Now  define  a  mapping 
c; : H’-vl(S’)  x  ~~~xd(s’-‘)x{s}xd(s’-‘)x~~~xd(s”) 
such  that  c:(x)=(mt  ,...,  mi-l,s,mi+’  ,...,  mN),  VXE Hi.  It  is easy  to  check  that  cf 
is  a  conjecture  for  player  i  playing  s,  and  that  VXEJ~(S, {E’(T)}),  s  is  a  best 
response  to  c:(x)  among  all x-replacements  of  s.  Hence  SED’(T).  El K.  Basu  /  Extensive  games 
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The  most  interesting  f.:ature  of a reasonable  solution  is that  it allows  for  coopera- 
tion  in games  like  passing-the-parcel  discussed  in  Section  1.  In  that  example,  one 
reasonable  solution  is where  where  One  plays  coop  at  w and  Two  plays  fink  at x. 
The  reason  why  One  may  play  coop  at  w is that  this  being  incompatible  with  his 
rationalizable  strategy  he will appear  irrational  at x,  i.e.,  Q(x) = ( 1). That  being  so, 
Two  may  play  fink  or  coop  (the  latter  with  the  conjecture  that  One  may,  thanks  to 
his unpredictability,  play  coop  at u).  Hence  a possible  conjecture  of  One  is that,  if 
x  is reached,  Two  will play  coop.  And  in  that  case  One’s  best  response  is to  play 
coop  at  w. 
A slight variation  of the same game could  make  the reasonable  strategy  set of each 
player  unique.  Consider  the  game  f’. 
In r’,  One  has  nothing  to  gain  by  appearing  irrational,  since  at x,  Two  will neces- 
sarily  play  fink.  Hence  One’s  only  reasonable  strategy  is to  fink  at  w. 
Consider  the  next  game  f2,  which  has  been  discussed  by  Pearce.  If  player  Two 
is reached,  clearly  he plays  8,.  Knowing  this  and  knowing  that  he cannot  influence 
Two’s  play  by  appearing  to  be  irrational,  One  will play  a2.  Hence,  the  reasonable 
solution  is unique  and  it  coincides  with  Pearce’s  rationalizable  solution.  Since  in 
T2,  One  playing  CY,  and  Two  playing  p2 is a  Nash  equilibrium,  this  shows  that  not 
all  Nash  equilibria  are  reasonable.  The  above  examples  illustrate  that  in  non- 
controversial  cases the  reasonable  and  rationalizable  outcomes  coincide.  Difference 
of  opinion  arises  in  more  controversial  games  and  this  paper  argues  that  in  such 
cases,  the  criterion  of  reasonableness  is the  more  appealing. 258  K.  Basu  /  Extensive  games 
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Given  a game  r,  we say  that  this  is an n-period  game  if  n = maxzEz  l(z),  where 
l(z)  is the  number  of  nodes  preceding  z. From  the  above  examples  it should  be clear 
that  for  all games  of less than  three  periods,  the rationalizable  outcomes  and  reason- 
able  outcomes  coincide.  This  is  because,  in  such  games  no  player  can  influence 
others  by  appearing  to  be  irrational.  This  means  that  in  games  like  passing-the- 
parcel  cooperation  can  be  explained  only  if  the  games  are  played  over  sufficient 
periods,  namely  three  or  more.  As a future  research  project  one  may  try  to  include 
more  structure  in  the  reasonableness  criterion  so  that  we obtain  results  like  -  the 
longer  the  game,  the  more  likely  is cooperation  in  the  early  games. 
The  kind  of  argument  applicable  to  passing-the-parcel  carries  over,  by  analogy, 
to  the  finitely-repeated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma.3  It  may  be worthwhile  for  a player  to 
adopt  the  cooperative  strategy  in the  first  game  and  thereby  appear  unpredictable 
to  the  opponent.  This  breaks  down  the  backward  induction  argument.  Once  this 
happens,  it is entirely  possible  for  the two players  to play coop  for  some  time  though 
they  are  bound  to  end  up  noncooperating. 
5.  Conclusion 
Though  in this  paper  attention  was  confined  to  games  of  perfect  information,  it 
is not  difficult  to  see that  similar  arguments  hold  for  games  of  imperfect  informa- 
tion.  Detailed  analysis  will  have  to  await  the  formalization  of  reasonableness  for 
imperfect-information  games.  But,  in the  meantime,  some  intuitive  remarks  may  be 
instructive. 
The  main  difficulty  with  a  formal  definition  of  reasonableness  for  games  of 
imperfect-information  is that  there  may  be no obvious  way of  defining  a predictabi- 
lity  map.  That  is,  there  is no  obvious  unique  counterpart  of  Definition  3.  First  of 
all,  note  that  Q will be defined  for  each  information  set instead  of  node.  Now  there 
may  exist  an  information  set which  can  be reached  if either  one  of  two  players  has 
3 And  much  of  the  same  argument  carries  over  to  the  Chain  Store  Paradox  (Selten,  1978)  as  well.  It 
is,  however,  interesting  to  note  that  in  a  game  where  the  opponent  changes  with  each  repetition  coopera- 
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been  irrational.  Which  player  should  the decision-maker  at this information  set take 
to  be  unpredictable?  This  is the  kind  of  conceptual  issue  that  one  would  need  to 
solve  before  developing  a  formal  framework. 
There  are  however  games  where  such  conceptual  problems  do  not  arise  and  one 
can  informally  isolate  reasonableness  in  imperfect-information  games  using  the 
argument  developed  in this  paper.  Consider  Kohlberg’s  celebrated  example,  repro- 
duced  here  as r3. 
r3 
Since  r3  is a two-period  game  no  player  has  an  advantage  in appearing  irrational. 
Hence,  the  same  argument  as in Pearce  (p.  1044) applies  here  and  the  only  reason- 
able  strategy  is a2 for  player  One  and p,  for  player  Two.  Since One  playing  (Y,  ,  and 
Two  playing  p2  is  a  perfect  equilibrium  and  also  a  sequential  equilibrium,  this 
shows  that  not  all  perfect  or  sequential  equilibria  are  reasonable. 
In the  traditional  analysis  of  an extensive  game  of  perfect  information  if a player 
makes  a  move  which  is not  rationalizable,  other  players  ignore  this  information. 
This  paper  tries  to take  into  account  the  fact  that  players  are sensitive  to such infor- 
mation  and  may  make  use  of  it.  There  are,  however,  alternative  ways  in  which  a 
player  may  interpret  the  irrationalizable  move  of  another  player.  Consequently  by 
adopting  alternative  assumptions  we could  modify  the  criterion  of  reasonable  stra- 
tegies  developed  in this paper.  Just  to  take  an example  suppose  that  we assume  that 
if any  playerj  makes  a move  (at  a node  that  is not  terminal  or  preterminal)  which 
is not  rationalizable  then  others  believe  that  j  is rational  but  does  not  know  that 
others  (i.e.,  all  i#j)  are  rational.  This  would  give  us a  slightly  modified  criterion 
of  reasonableness  which  would  imply  for  games  like the  repeated  Prisoner’s  Dilem- 
ma  a  slightly  earlier  breakdown  of  cooperation. 
These  are  alternatives  worth  exploring  but  the  essential  point  stressed  here  is that 
as  an  extensive  game  proceeds,  players  may  modify  their  opinion  about  one  an- 
other’s  rationality.  This,  in turn,  means  that  some  player  may  try  to  influence  the 
opinions  of  others  regarding  his rationality.  To  ignore  this  is to  ignore  an  essential 
informational  aspect  of  the  extensive  form.4 
4 Around  the  time  that  this  paper  was  being  written,  Phil  Reny  was  working  on  the  same  theme  and 
reached  similar  conclusions  (see  Reny,  1986),  as  we  discovered  later  on  meeting. 260  K.  Bum  /  Exrensive  games 
References 
D.  Bernheim,  Rationalizable  strategic  behavior,  Econometrica  52 (1984)  1007-1028. 
D.  Kreps,  P.  hlilgrom,  _I. Roberts  and  R.  Wilson,  Rational  cooperation  in  the  finitely-repeated 
Prisoner’s  Dilemma,  J.  Econ.  Theory  27 (1982) 245-252. 
D.  Kreps  and  R.  Wilson,  Sequential  equilibria,  Econometrica  50 (1982) 863-894. 
A.  Mclennan,  Justifiable  beliefs  in  sequential  equilibrium,  Econometrica  53 (1985) 889-904. 
R.B.  Myerson,  Refinements  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  concept,  Int.  J.  Game  Theory  7 (1978) 73-80. 
D.G.  Pearce,  Rationalizable  strategic  behavior  and  the  problem  of  perfection,  Econometrica  52 (1984) 
1029-1050. 
P.  Reny,  Rationality,  Common  knowledge  and  the  theory  of  games,  Ph.D.  dissertation,  Princeton 
University,  1986. 
R.  Selten,  Reexamination  of  the  perfectness  concept  for  equilibrium  points  in extensive  games,  Int.  J. 
of  Game  Theory  4 (1975) 25-55. 
R.  Selten,  The  chain  store  paradox,  Theory  and  Decision  9 (1978)  127-159. 